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INTRODUCTION

When the Framers of the Constitution drafted the Intellectual Property
Clause, they sought to promote science and technological advancement by
prescribing limited monopolies in recognition of the hard work of inventors,
in exchange for public disclosure and dissemination of their inventions for
the public good.' The discovery of algorithmic programming of electronic
devices by Lord Byron's daughter Ada Lovelace, no less 2-and
the
subsequent developments in computing has long complicated matters. These
modem marvels have rewritten the rules of business, but their abstract
natures have to date ill-fitted the preexisting forms and implementations of
intellectual property protection.
Software is patentable in the United States but has been the subject of
much debate. 3 In part because software is difficult to describe in traditional
patent claims (due in part to lack of any requirement to provide enabled
computer code when applying for patent protection), the patent office has
struggled with the contours of software patentability, while courts have
struggled with interpreting software claims and applying them to actual
technologies in infringement actions.4
This difficulty in defining disclosure leads to broad, ambiguous claims
that do not give clear notice of either the claimed invention or the patentee's

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
2.
See Luigi Federico Menabrea & Ada Lovelace, Sketch of the Analytical Engine
invented by Charles Babbage ... with notes by the translator(Ada Lovelace trans., 1843), in
RICHARD TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MEMOIRS 666-731 (Richard Taylor ed., London, Richard and
John E. Taylor 1843). For an entertaining graphic novel treatment of the early work of Ada
Lovelace and Charles Babbage, see SYDNEY PADUA, THE THRILLING ADVENTURES OF
LOVELACE AND BABBAGE: THE (MOSTLY) TRUE STORY OF THE FIRST COMPUTER (2015).
3.
Holly K. Victorson, Note, Structure from Nothing and Claims for Free: Using a
Whole-System View of the Patent System to Improve Notice and Predictabilityfor Software
Patents, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 497, 498 (2014); cf Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 285 (1970) (arguing that while copyright protections should
not be abolished, nor should they be "extend[ed] or strengthen[ed]"). See generally IAN
STEWART, WHY BEAUTY IS TRUTH: THE HISTORY OF SYMMETRY 5 (2007) (discussing the
importance of mathematics used by the Babylonians to solve complex equations).
4.
See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

259, 314 (2016) (stating that patent applicants will likely add more specific details in the
patent documents for software because of Alice).
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rights.5 Such claims often appear in otherwise legitimate patents and confuse
and frustrate straightforward licensing and product development. The
resulting "software patent thicket" leads to portfolios with hundreds, if not
thousands, of claims protecting incremental software. 6 To be clear, this is
not good for practicing patent owners, either-according to economists (as
cited by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)), "the
less clear the claim boundaries are, the more likely that others will infringe
the patent or will continue to infringe when confronted by the patent
owner." 7 Indeed, when entities acquire swaths of these ambiguous patents,
they can broadly restrict other players from entry into the marketplace and
can use these patents to extract exorbitant fees from innovators far beyond
any compensation needed to encourage innovation.8 Then, these entities can
restrict entry through patent infringement litigation. 9
Recently, there has been a rise in meritless infringement lawsuits
abusing our patent system.1 0 These litigants-so-called patent trolls or non-

5.
See Shane D. Anderson, Software, Abstractness, and Soft Physicality Requirements,
29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567, 577-78 (2016) ("Software patents generally have broad claims
that are fuzzy and ambiguous, and thus do not give clear notice of either the claimed invention
or the patentee's rights."); see also James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at
Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 170 (2007) (showing that software
patents contain 33% more claims than other patents on average).
6.
See Anderson, supra note 5, at 577 (citing Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON.
119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffee et al. eds., 2001)) (stating that a patent thicket is "an overlapping set
of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses
from multiple patentees").
7.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-490, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENT OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE

QUALITY,

REASSESS INCENTIVES, AND IMPROVE CLARITY

11 (2016).
8.
See James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
241, 248 (2012) ("When firms acquire large numbers of patents, they can restrict entry into an
industry and they can use these patents to extract rents from other firms beyond the rents
needed to encourage innovation."); see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 577 ("Thickets cause
undue hold-up at firms, increase the cost of entry for new players, increase the cost of R&D,
and suppress innovation."); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation
in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2001) ("[W]ith software patents now being
issued in large numbers, the patent system plays a newly prominent role in shaping the
development of the software industry . . . [,] [but] it is also possible that the patent system may
constrain innovation if it draws protection too broadly.").
9.
See Bessen, supra note 8, at 248 ("Prospective innovators consider the risk of
subsequent litigation when deciding whether to invest in research and development.").
10. See GAO- 16-490, supra note 7, at 1 (finding that new patent infringement lawsuits
increased from about 2,000 in 2007 to more than 5,000 in 2015); Anderson, supra note 5, at
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practicing entities (NPEs)-often instigate a barrage of litigation against
myriad defendants for the sake of less money than the cost of defending
against spurious claims." Others essentially extort high licensing fees for
bad patents on fundamental concepts that somehow passed muster during the
examination process at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).1 2 "Ultimately, the victim innovator must pour resources into
licensing or litigation against bad patents, rather than into socially beneficial
innovation."' 3 The GAO reports that district court filings of patent
infringement lawsuits have increased from about 2,000 in 2007 to more than
5,000 in 2015, and most of these suits involved software-related patents and
computer and communications technologies.' 4 At the same time, the USPTO
has gone from issuing 100,000 patents a year in 1996 (and less than 50,000 a
few years before that) to issuing more than 320,000 patents twenty years
later. '5 With at least three times the available assets, it is fair to expect that a
growing number of software patent suits on the federal court dockets will
continue to exacerbate the high overall cost of nuisance litigation. Likewise,
patent utility applications are at an all-time high, with more than 600,000
new applications arriving in 2016.16
The innovative software industry grows and evolves rapidly. Some point
out that the slow-moving patent examination process does not interact well
with the fast-moving software industry.' 7 Many software patents do not go
to software companies but rather to LLCs and companies outside of the
software industry.' Many scholars point out that the software patent thicket

568 (stating that some have attributed the increase in infringement lawsuits to patent trolls who
frequently use software patents to engage in meritless infringement suits).
11. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 578-79.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 579; see, e.g., Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million
Settlement, CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/
technology/rimm_ntp (discussing the litigation between Research in Motion (RIM) and nonproducing patent-holding company NTP, Inc., in which RIM settled out of court by paying
over $600 million to NTP for patents that were largely invalidated years later by the USPTO).
14. See GAO-16-490, supra note 7, at 14, 20.
15. See USPTO, 2016 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 19, 178, 181
(2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY 1 6PAR.pdf.
16. Id
17. See Eric Goldman, The Problems with Software Patents (Part] of3), FORBES (Nov.
28, 2012, 2:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/11/28/the-problemswith-software-patents/#5a612c0 14391 (stating that the lifecycles of software frequently end
before patents issue).
18. See id at 56 (finding that the majority of software patents are granted to publicly
listed companies).
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problem "arises from the flood of patents that are granted by the [USPTO]
each year," and this is evidenced by the more than 300,000 utility patents
granted in 2016 alone.' 9 Intuitively, having more patents results in a higher
probability of overlaps particularly when many innovators remain willfully
ignorant of what is patented. 20
Despite arguments that software patents create impediments to the
software industry rather than spur innovation in any meaningful way, 21
software patents can and should still be a valuable tool to promote public
information and innovation; to facilitate American businesses through
limited monopolies; and to provide a plethora of other economic benefits.
But harnessing the value of software patents requires weeding out thousands
of low-quality claims. The solution? Significant structural and regulatory
reforms in the examination process at the USPTO, which currently allows
hundreds of thousands of patents to issue each year, resulting in a state of
affairs that leads to non-practicing entities like Intellectual Ventures
amassing portfolios of tens of thousands of patents. 22

19. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 578 (citing Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or MarketMakers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 125
(2010)); see also 2016 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 15, at 19,

181.
20. See Mark A. Lemley, IgnoringPatents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21.
21. See id. at 27 (arguing that competition is a better spur to innovation than the
monopoly granted through patent law).
22. Intellectual Ventures' website boasts that "[w]e've acquired 95,000 patents and
patent applications over our company's lifespan. Today, we have approximately 30,000 in
active monetization programs that span 50 technology areas . . . and rising." Our Patent
Portfolio,

INTELLECTUAL

VENTURES,

http://www.intellectualventures.com/inventions-

patents/patent-portfolio/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (emphases added). For example, while
difficult to verify, assignment records show that for Intellectual Ventures Management, one of
Intellectual Ventures' many subsidiaries, more than 152 U.S. patent assets have been listed
alone. See, e.g., Assignment Database, USPTO, https://assignment.uspto.gov/patent/index.
html#/patent/search (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). This only includes assigned assets that have
been voluntarily recorded. As Professor Jorge Contreras notes, the only penalty parties
generally pay from keeping their transfers and sales of assets and patent licenses secret (until
occasionally forced by courts to record) is the old intervening bona fide purchaser problem
those who took property in law school should remember well. Unlike motorcycles, cars,
automobiles, homes, land, and hunting licenses, there is no government-maintained
recordation associated with real legal benefit, and many NPEs use this fact to their advantage,
masking ownership until necessary. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
543, 601 02 (2015); Jorge L. Contreras, Assertions of Standards-EssentialPatents by NonPracticingEntities, in PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES & COMPETITION POLICY 50 (D. Daniel

Sokol ed., 2017). Interestingly, there was a proposed rule to that effect in 2014 that has been
discarded, but that would have required disclosure of the ultimate parent corporate entity on
pain of abandonment, among other things. See generally Changes to Require Identification of
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This Article proposes means to deal with the problem at its source by
eliminating "low-quality" patents from issue through structural and
regulatory reforms in the USPTO's examination process. Part II explores the
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions before and after Alice. This
part provides a detailed background on the development of software
patenting through court decisions and how these decisions have shaped the
software industry. Part III discusses the impact of software patents on the
software industry and software companies ranging from startups to large
entities. Part IV emphasizes the importance of having software patents and
proposes four solutions to combat the software patent thicket and the
burgeoning issue of low-quality patent claims issuing from the USPTO.
II.

SOFTWARE PATENT HISTORY

A.

Priorto the Supreme Court's Alice Decision

For decades, courts and the USPTO have been struggling to determine
whether and how to protect software. Unfazed, the industry and innovation
advanced at breakneck speed. For instance, "[i]n the late 1960s, the USPTO
took a hard anti-software stance, issuing examination guidelines in 1968 that
held computer programs generally unpatentable."2 3 In parallel, the Supreme
Court, in Gottschalk v. Benson, analyzed a general-purpose digital computer
that converted signals from binary-coded decimal into pure binary
numbers. 24 The Court first explained that "[p]henomena of nature ... mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are
the basic tools of scientific and technological work." 25 The Court then ruled
that the claims in question were "so abstract and sweeping as to cover both
known and unknown uses" of the mathematical algorithm in question
because the mathematical formula involved had "no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer." 2 6 The Court's
primary concern was that granting such a patent on basic software would
"wholly pre-empt" the mathematical formula and allow for its
monopolization. 2 7 From the beginning, the Court expressly stated that an

Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 (Jan. 24, 2014). The status of the proposed rule is
unclear.
23.

See Anderson, supra note 5, at 569.

24. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
25. Id. at 67.
26. Id. at 68, 71.
27. Id. at 71-72.
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intangible invention would not satisfy statutory muster and that the invention
must have some physical effect to be patentable. 28
Five years later, the Court in Parkerv. Flook highlighted the concern set
forth in Benson.29 In Flook, driven by concerns that a "competent
draftsman" should not be able to transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea
into a patent-eligible application by appending conventional or obvious
"post-solution activity," the Court held that a claim reciting an abstract idea
must also include an "inventive concept" to be patent-eligible. 30 Under this
new "inventive concept" threshold, a "process is unpatentable under Section
101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but
because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention." 31
The combination of Benson and Flook virtually eliminated patent
protection for software Benson labeled algorithms, and thus by
extension all software, as patent-ineligible abstract ideas, and Flook
by indicating that, as long as an invention's sole point-of-novelty
lay in the software, no additional limitation could be "enough" to
confer patent eligibility. 32

The turning point for software patentability was Diamond v. Diehr, in
which the Court reversed course, effectively lowering the threshold of patent
eligibility for software inventions. 33 In Diehr, the Court upheld the

28. Id at 70.
29. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
30. Id at 590, 594.
31. Id at 594.
32. Ognjen Zivojnovic, Patentable Subject Matter after Alice DistinguishingNarrow
Software Patentsfrom Overly Broad Business Method Patents, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807,

813 (2015).
33. The case below, authored by the well-respected Court of Claims and Patent Appeals
Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, was a watershed for software patents. In it, he wrote:
A claim drawn to a process or method does not depend for its validity under 35
U.S.C. § 101 on whether a computer is involved. If the claim is drawn to subject
matter, which is otherwise statutory, it does not become nonstatutory merely
because a computer is involved in its execution. Thus, the fact that an invention is
drawn to a computer program or involves a computer is an observation which does
nothing to aid in the determination of compliance with [section] 101 .... Therefore,
any rejection which is based solely on the determination that a computer or
computer program is involved is insupportable because it is overly broad and must
be reversed as being without basis in the law.
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patentability under Section 101 of a computer-controlled process for curing
synthetic rubber.3 4 Although unapplied mathematical algorithms, formulas,
and equations are considered unpatentable abstract ideas, the Court in Diehr
made clear that the presence of such mathematical subject matter in a patent
claim does not necessarily deprive the claim of potential patentability under
Section 101.35 Contrary to the previous decisions, the Court concluded that
Diehr did not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but rather sought to
protect a process of curing synthetic rubber.3 6 This process "admittedly
employ[ed] a well-known mathematical equation, but [it did] not seek to
pre-empt the use of that equation." 3 7 One did not need a computer to cure
natural or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the
process significantly lessened the possibility of "overcuring" or
"undercuring," the process as a whole did not thereby become unpatentable
subject matter.38 Here, the Court redefined the contours of patent eligibility
for software by paring back the ineligibility barrier created in Benson and
Flook. Thereafter, "software related patents began to trickle into [and thus
out of] the [USPTO] as skillful patent prosecutors began to couch their
software claims into patentable processes." 3 9
In the thirty years following the Diehr decision, "[u]ncertainty regarding
software's patent eligibility returned in the wake of the Supreme Court's
2010 Bilski v. Kappos and 2012 Mayo CollaborativeServices v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. decisions." 40 These cases, while not categorically
excluding software innovation from the patent system, effectively "raised
the 'enough' threshold for patent eligibility, so that § 101 again became a
substantive hurdle for software."41

Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
34. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176 77 (Specifically, the invention involved a process for curing
synthetic rubber by monitoring the real-time conditions inside the mold. This process was
"possible using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of
the Arrhenius equation when to open the press and remove the cured product.").
35. Id at 187.
36. Id. at 192.
37. Id at 187.
38. Id
39. See Jack George Abid, Software Patents on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 23 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 815, 825 (2005).
40. See Zivojnovic, supra note 32, at 816.
41. See id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)).
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The Bilski decision stemmed from the Federal Circuit's now-infamous
"machine-or-transformation" test. 42 The key issues for the Federal Circuit

were whether Bilski was "seeking to claim a fundamental principle (such as
an abstract idea) or a mental process," and if so, whether Bilski's claim
"would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle if
allowed." 43 The Federal Circuit held that "[a] claimed process is surely
patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing." 44 Bilski's claimed invention involved a method of hedging risk in the
field of commodities trading. 45 With the understanding of "transformation"
in hand, the Federal Circuit returned to its analysis of Bilski's claims and
concluded that they did not satisfy the "transformation" prong of the
machine-or-transformation test because Bilski's claimed process for hedging
risk in commodities trading involved the "[p]urported transformations or
manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships,
business risks, or other such abstractions . . . ."46 The court further explained
that such abstractions cannot satisfy the transformation test because "they
are not physical objects or substances" like the rubber cured in Diehr, and
"they are not representative of physical objects or substances." 47 Here, the
court did not resolve the threshold disclosure required for software patents to
remain patent-eligible. 48 Rather, the court vaguely asserted that transforming
data representing a physical object and displaying such data was sufficient to
meet the transformation prong of the test. 49

The Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Bilski left the patent
eligibility of software uncertain. While the Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit's decision, it reversed the Federal Circuit's analysis, concluding that
even though it was "an important and useful clue," "[t]he machine-ortransformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a
patent-eligible 'process' under Section 101.50 The Court refused to adopt
categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts.

42. In Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd but criticized by sub
nom. Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
43. In Re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952- 53.
44. Id at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
45. Id at 949.
46. Id at 963.
47. Id at 945.
48. See generally In Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd but
criticized by sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
49. InreBilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
50. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604.
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Instead, the Court resolved the case "narrowly on the basis of the Court's
[prior] decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr... ." In view of Benson,
Flook, and Diehr, the Court concluded that the basic concept of hedging is
an unpatentable abstract idea and that "[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk
hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea."5 2 However, the Court
did "not define further what constitutes a patentable 'process' and refrained
from going beyond the definition provided in Section 100(b).53
Relatedly, the Supreme Court in Mayo was examining the same question
as Bilski in the context of drug dosage, but it did not add much substantively
to patent eligibility of software inventions. 54 In Mayo, the invention at issue
involved a method for calibrating the proper dosage of a drug for treating
autoimmune diseases such as Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis." The
key exception there was "law of nature" rather than "abstract idea." The
Court again directed its attention to Diehr and Flook to determine whether
an invention drawn to laws of nature must have additional steps to transform
the process into an inventive application of the formula.5 6 The Court
explained that the additional steps in Diehr "apparently added to the formula
something that in terms of patent law's objectives had significance-they
transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula."5 7 In
determining whether the claims transformed unpatentable natural
correlations into patentable applications, the Court inquired about whether
"any additional steps consist[ed] of well-understood, routine, conventional
activity already engaged in by the scientific community. . . ."" The Court
found that the claim, simply telling doctors to (1) measure the current level
of metabolite; (2) use particular laws of nature to calculate the current
toxicity/inefficacy limits; and (3) reconsider the drug dosage based off of
those same laws of nature, added nothing to the laws of nature.5 9 Thereafter,

51. Id at 609.
52. Id at 611-12.
53. Id at 612.
54. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012).
55. Id at 73.
56. Id. at 72-73.
57. Id. at 82 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)) (contrasting claims with
the claims in Flook, which were process claims that supplemented the recitation of a
mathematical formula for updating alarm limits, and stating they were "well known" such that
there "was no 'inventive concept' in the claimed application of the formula").
58. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79-80.
59. Id at 82.
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the Court held that "those [additional] steps, when viewed as a whole, add
nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately." 60
"After Bilski and Mayo, the Federal Circuit issued a series of seemingly
inconsistent decisions regarding the patent eligibility of claims directed to
computer-implemented

software

or algorithms." 6 1 Lacking

a coherent

framework or affirmative guidance from the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit continued to flounder, working diligently to apply vague precedent
panel by panel while navigating the swamp of verbiage regarding Section
101.62 "The Federal Circuit also had to contend with increasingly hostile
public outcry against patent protection for these types of inventions." 63 At
the time, some argued that "the outcome of any particular case depended
more on which judges heard the case, rather than the actual merits and the
claim language. "64

In an attempt to clarify the patent protection for software and computerrelated inventions, the Federal Circuit in 2013 published a bitterly divided en
banc opinion in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. with six
different opinions, including one set of "additional views" by then-Chief
Judge Rader. 65 Unfortunately, the unusually fractured opinion failed to
provide guidance to the bar or the lower courts on what constituted an
abstract idea or what constituted "enough" to be an inventive concept to
overcome an abstract idea.66
1.

The Supreme Court's Alice Decision

In 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS Bank) sued Alice Corporation
Pty. Ltd. (Alice) seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability of Alice's patents. 67 Alice was the assignee
of several patents at issue that "enable[d] the management of risk relating to

60. Id at 80.
61. See Zivojnovic, supra note 32, at 818.
62. Kristen Osenga, Debugging Software's Schemas, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1832,
1841 (2014) (citing MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir.
2012)).
63. Id
64. See Zivojnovic, supra note 32, at 818-19.
65. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc),
aff'd sub. nom. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
66. See id at 1290 (stating that the appropriate question was whether the computerbased limitations added "enough" beyond the abstract idea itself without further explanation of
what was "enough").
67. Id. at 1274.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
188

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 177

specified, yet unknown, future events."68 Specifically, the claims were
designed "to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two
parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary." 69 "All of
the claims [were] implemented using a computer . . . ."70

As noted, a divided three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit held that the
claims at issue were directed to an abstract idea, and on rehearing en banc,
the court narrowly reversed the three-panel decision and affirmed the
judgment of the district court that the claims were patent-ineligible. 7 ' Seven
of the ten judges participated in the opinion, and "the only thing a majority
of the court agreed on was that the invention in question was not eligible for
patenting; there was no agreement as to why."

72

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the fractured en banc
decision. The claims at issue involved "a computerized scheme for
mitigating 'settlement risk' . . . ."73
During oral argument, Mark A. Perry, counsel for the respondent, noted
that the CBM method Congress created at the USPTO provided a workable

68. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2353.
71. Id.
72. Osenga, supra note 62, at 1842; see, e.g., Zivojnovic, supra note 32, at 818 ("One
faction of the court argued that a computer must 'play a significant part in' or 'be integral to'
the claimed invention, 'facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or
computations could not' for the limitation to be 'enough' to confer patent eligibility to an
otherwise patent-ineligible abstract idea. The other faction argued that unless a claim is so
lacking in additional limitation that it is 'manifestly evident that [it] is directed to a patentineligible abstract idea,' a claim incorporating an abstract idea is patent-eligible."); Bancorp

Servs. LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
73. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352; see Zivojnovic, supra note 32, at 820 (providing an
explanation of the invention in Alice, stating that "two individuals may agree in the morning to
exchange currencies, but, to avoid allowing either party to gain a benefit by exactly timing its
acceptance based on fluctuations in the exchange rate, the two individuals might agree that the
exchange rate at the end of the day is controlling. When forming such a contract, a mechanism
is necessary to ensure that each party is still able to pay its side of the bargain at the end of the
day. The claimed invention solves this issue by having a trusted third-party keep track, via a
so-called shadow credit and/or debit record, of a contracting party's financial transactions
between the time a contract is initially formed (e.g., in the morning, when the two individuals
agree to exchange currencies) and when it matures (e.g., at the end of the day, when the
controlling exchange rate is set) ... . Once the contract matures, the third-party instructs an
exchange institution . .
to perform non-blocked financial transactions") (citing CLS Bank

Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223, 228-29 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 717 F.3d
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
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test that had been blessed by Congress and, it should be noted, is somewhat
consistent with European practice. 74 He noted:
Congress, in the CBM method, said business methods that are
subject to special scrutiny that is, dubious patents-include
methods and corresponding apparatuses, which is what we have
here, that pertain to data processing in the financial services
industry and do not offer a technological solution. That describes
Alice's patents to a letter, Your Honor.71
The oral arguments and briefing at the Supreme Court debated and
raised some version of this technological test, among others. 76 But while the
Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Perry on the outcome, they neither adopted
nor relied on any version of the "technological solution" test.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all of the claims at issue were
patent-ineligible, holding that "the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention." 7 7 The Court employed a version of their two-step analysis set
forth in the Mayo framework, which first determines whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts.78 Second, the
Court "consider[s] the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an

74. The European Patent Office's standard reflects "technological" means. EPO Case
Number T 0258/03 (Auction Method/HITACHI) (holding unpatentable patents that do not
provide a technical solution to a technical problem as lacking inventive step as required by
Article 52(1) EPC) (referencing EPO Case Number T 0641/00 (Comvik/Two Identities)
(EPO)), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t00064 1 epl.pdf.
An invention consisting of a mixture of technical and non-technical features and
having technical character as a whole is to be assessed with respect to the
requirement of inventive step by taking account of all those features which
contribute to said technical character whereas features making no such contribution
cannot support the presence of inventive step.
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.
Ct. 734 (2013) (No. 13-298) (argument of Mark A. Perry, Esq., on behalf of the Respondents).
76. Id. at 29-30, 32 ("does not offer a technological solution," "technological
solutions," "technological solution to a business problem, a social problem, or a technological
problem," "to improve other technological fimctions," "there is a technological link here," "the
use of computer technology to improve the functioning of another technological process")
(argument of Carter G. Phillips, Esq., on behalf of Petitioners and Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Esq.,
on behalf of the United States).
77. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352.
78. Id. at 2355 (explaining that claims drawn to "laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are patent-ineligible concepts).
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ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements
'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." 79
In the first step, the Court considered the concept of intermediated
settlement in conjunction with the concept of hedging in Bilski.so In Bilski,
the Court explained that "hedging is a fundamental economic practice long
prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance
class."" Therefore, "'the concept of hedging' as recited by the claims in suit
was a patent ineligible 'abstract idea' . . . ."82 Similarly, the Court in Alice
held that the claims were drawn to abstract idea because "the concept of
intermediated settlement is 'a fundamental economic practice long prevalent
in our system of commerce."'83 Under the second step, the Court held that
"transformation into a patent-eligible application requires more than simply
stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words 'apply it."'

84

The

Supreme Court then concluded that the claims at issue, including all of the
method, system, and storage medium claims, do no more than "simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated
settlement on a generic computer.""
Troublingly, the Court was vague as to what qualified as an "abstract
idea" and what was "significantly enough" to transform an abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter.8 6 After determining that this particulartype
of intermediate settlement at issue was an abstract idea, the Court did not
further "delimit the precise contours of the 'abstract ideas' category . . . .""
The Court also rejected petitioner's argument that an idea must exist
independent of human action in order to qualify for the abstract idea
exception." With regards to the second prong of the test, whether the claims
contain an inventive concept to transform the abstract idea into a patenteligible application, the Court simply noted that "well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry" were not sufficient
to confer patent eligibility.8 9 The Court further determined that, with the

79.
(2012)).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73
Id.
Id. at 2356 (citing Bilskiv. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)).
Id. (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611).
Id
Id at 2357 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2359.
See id. at 2357.
Id.
Id. at 2356-57.
Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73) (internal quotations omitted).
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ubiquity of computers, "wholly generic computer implementation" and a
generic computer performing generic-computer functions are insufficient to
protect against drafting efforts to monopolize an abstract idea, and thus
"wholly generic computer implementations" do not transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible subject matter.90
While many scholars will agree that "[t]he current collection of
unpatentable subject matter-abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomena-is
difficult
to
define
and thus
exclude
from
patenting[,] ... [p]art of that difficulty stems from the lack of a consistent
theoretical underpinning for the doctrine." 9' Compounding such existing
difficulty, the Supreme Court's perceived lack of guidance has led to further
confusion among many practitioners, the lower courts, and the USPTO, 92
and it has also led to a surprising number of patents cancelled by the lower
courts.93 Although the Alice decision seemingly ended pure business method
patents, it left much room for interpretation with regards to pure software
patents, and it remains to be seen how the Federal Circuit and the USPTO
will implement the Supreme Court's ambiguous guidance. 94
2.

FederalCircuitDecisions FollowingAlice

After the Alice decision, many practitioners and the USPTO have been
relying on the Federal Circuit to clarify the Supreme Court's notably
ambiguous opinion. 95 Interpreting Alice and other prior Supreme Court
cases, the Federal Circuit has been struggling to find a common ground in
applying the Alice two-prong test. To strike the balance between preventing
monopolization and promoting innovation, the Supreme Court has "urged
the courts and agency tribunals to 'tread carefully' going forward in
construing inventions and innovations to be non-patent-eligible abstract

90. Id. at 2358 59 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
91. See J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 280 (2015).
92. See Scott Alter, One Year After Alice: Was it the Right Medicine?, LAW360 (June
18,
2015),
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/654471 /one-year-after-alice-was-it-the-rightmedicine (discussing the trend in lower courts of invalidating patent eligibility for not meeting
the requirements of Section 101).
93. Id.
94. See id. (discussing the "ambiguous language in that case," cautioning it would lead
to "unpredictable applications").
95. See Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Once in a [Planet] Blue Moon Software
Patents as Alice Turns Two, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g =e4ab9515a9e640e8a73dd3088 1 c6b7f7.
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ideas 'lest [the exclusionary principles] swallow all of patent law."' 96
Nonetheless, from January to September 2016, the Federal Circuit
invalidated fifty-three software patents out of fifty-eight total decisions on
subject matter ground. 97 This unsettling invalidation rate has worried some
in the software industry and poses a threat to the protection of valuable
software patents in our patent system.
These cases raise a serious question: Do we want a system where one
arm grants 300,000 patents a year98 and two other arms-the federal courts
and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)-cancel hundreds of
claims?99

As noted, a string of software patent invalidations followed the Alice
decision. On July 11, 2014, the Federal Circuit held that Digitech's device
profile and method claims for creating a device profile within a digital image
processing system were drawn to abstract idea and added no inventive
concept and were therefore patent-ineligible. 100 The invention was directed
to "the generation and use of an 'improved device profile' that describes
spatial and color properties of a device within a digital image processing
system."' 0 ' In short, Digitech's device profile "enabl[ed] a more accurate
translation of the image's pixel data into the independent color space and

96. Id (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014));
see Jonathan Stroud, Patent Post-Grant Review After Alice, BAYLOR L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (discussing the American Bar Association's Post-Alice Task Force).
97. See Manatt, supra note 95 (citing Robert R. Sachs, Alicestorm Update for Fall
2016, BILSKI BLOG (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/10/alicestormupdate-turbulence-and-troubles-.html [hereinafter Sachs, Alicestorm Fall2016 Update].
98.

See 2016 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 15, at 19, 178,

181.
99. One is reminded of the Dr. Seuss story The Sneetches. Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches and
Other Stories (1953), http://www.csun.edu/-sm60012/GRCS-Files/Final%`20Projects/The%/
20Sneetches.htm. In it, two groups, the Star-Belly Sneetches and the Plain-Belly Sneetches vie
for cultural superiority until one day, Sylvester McMonkey McBean came and offered to put
stars on the Plain-Belly Sneetches' bellies. He did and then offered to remove the stars from
the original Star-Belly Sneetches' bellies. In the end, it became hopelessly confusing as to who
was from what group, as they kept paying until they had paid their last cent. In the end, the
only person who profited was, of course, Mr. McBean. A better patent system would prevent
such churn, issuing only quality patents and avoiding the need for review and reversal. In such
a system, the only parties that benefit are the lawyers-the McBeans of the world. The rest is a
transaction cost and thus corporate waste.
100. Digitech Image Tech. LLC v. Elec. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1347-48,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
101. Id. at 1347 (explaining that according to the '415 patent, "all imaging devices
impose some level of distortion on an image's color and spatial properties. This distortion
occurs because different devices (i.e., digital cameras, monitors, TVs, printers, etc.) allow for
slightly different ranges of colors and spatial information to be displayed or reproduced").
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across the source and output devices."' 02 The district court found that "the
'device profile' claims [were] directed to a collection of numerical data that
lacks a physical component or physical manifestation" and concluded that "a
'device profile' is nothing more than information," and thus patentineligible.1 03 The district court further concluded that "the asserted method
claims for generating a device profile encompass the abstract idea of
organizing data through mathematical correlations."104
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's decision. In
determining whether device profile claims were patent-eligible, the Federal
Circuit first asserted that "[flor all categories except process claims, the
eligible subject matter must exist in some physical or tangible form."'0o The
device profile was merely "comprised of two sets of data"-one for color
information and the other for spatial information.1 06 The court determined
that the claim did not recite anything "tangible or physical" to be eligible
under "machine," "manufacture," or "composition of matter" under Section
101 subject matter. 107 With regards to the method claims, Digitech argued
that the claims were "patent eligible because they describe a process for
generating a device profile that is specifically tied to a digital image
processing system and is integral to the transformation of a digital
image."'os However, the court rejected Digitech's argument and held that
the claims were directed to "an abstract idea because it describes a process
of organizing information through mathematical correlations and is not tied
to a specific structure or machine."' 09 The court reasoned that the claims
were merely "a process of taking two data sets and combin[ing] them into a
single data set.""1 0 Therefore, the court concluded that, "[w]ithout additional
limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate
existing information to generate additional information is not patent
eligible.""'
In PlanetBingo, Planet Bingo alleged that VKGS infringed its '045 and
'646 patents." 2 The '045 and '646 patents claimed "managing a bingo game

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id at 1348.
Id
Id
Id
Id at 1349.
Id. at 1348.
Id at 1350.
Id
Id. at 1351.
Id
Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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while allowing a player to repeatedly play the same sets of numbers in
multiple sessions."" 3 On August 26, 2014, the Federal Circuit held that the
claims at issue were "drawn to patent-ineligible subject matter."1 4 In doing
so, the court reasoned that "managing a game of Bingo" is analogous "to the
kind of 'organizing human activity' at issue in Alice.""' Furthermore, the
court concluded that the patents did not contain an "'inventive concept'
sufficient to 'transform' the claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible
application."11 6 Here, Planet Bingo argued that "the patents recite
'significantly more' than an abstract idea because the invention includes
'complex computer code with three distinct subparts.""' 7 The court rejected
that argument and held that the claims "recite a program that is used for the
generic functions of storing, retrieving, and verifying a chosen set of bingo
numbers. . . .""

On November 14, 2014, the Federal Circuit held that Ultramercial's
'545 patent was patent-ineligible.11 9 The '545 patent involved "a method for
distributing copyrighted media products over the Internet where the
consumer receives a copyrighted media product at no cost in exchange for
viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the copyrighted
content."1 20 After reviewing the ordered combination of steps recited in the
claims, the court determined that "the concept embodied by the majority of
the limitations describe[d] only the abstract idea of showing an
advertisement before delivering free content."121 In sum, the court simply
stated that the "method of using advertising as an exchange or currency" was
directed to an abstract idea.1 22 In the second step in the analysis, the court
determined that "the limitations of the '545 claims do not transform the
abstract idea .

.

. into patent-eligible

subject matter because

the claims

simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine,
conventional activity."1 23 Specifically, the court reasoned that "[a]dding
routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request

113.
114.
115.
(2014)).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id at 1007.
Id
Id at 1008 (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356
Id at 1009.
See id. at 1008.
Id at 1009.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 712.
Id at 715.
Id
Id
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from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of
the Internet does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible
subject matter." 2 4 "Instead, the claimed sequence of steps comprises only
'conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,' which is
insufficient to supply an 'inventive concept."'1 25 Thereafter, the court once
again rejected patent-eligibility of a software under Section 101.126 Shortly
after the Alice decision, the Federal Circuit invalidated all other software
claims under Section 101 until DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. 127
Despite the Federal Circuit's alarming number of invalidations against
software patents, on December 5, 2014, for the first time since Alice, the
Federal Circuit held that DDR Holdings' computer-implemented patent
claims overcame the Section 101 hurdle.1 28 DDR Holdings was an assignee
of a patent directed to "systems and methods of generating a composite web
page that combines certain visual elements of a 'host' website with content
of a third-party merchant."1 29 The specification explained the drawbacks of
the prior art systems that the prior art systems "allowed third-party
merchants to 'lure the host website's visitor traffic away' from the host
website because visitors would be taken to the third-party merchant's
website when they clicked on the merchant's advertisement on the host
site."130

124. Id at 716.
125. Id (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73, 79
(2012))).
126. Id at 715-17.
127. See, e.g., In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (concluding that a system and method claim for "classifying and storing digital images
in an organized manner" was drawn to abstract idea and the recitation of tangible components,
such as a "telephone unit" and a "server" failed to transform the abstract idea into a patenteligible invention); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(concluding that the claims recited no more than using a computer to send and receive
information over a network in order to implement the abstract idea of creating a "transaction
performance guaranty"); Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728
F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (concluding that claims merely recited "generalized
software components arranged to implement an abstract concept [of] generating [insurancepolicy-related] tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event" on a
computer); Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that claims recited no more than the use of a computer "employed
only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations," to implement the
abstract idea of managing a stable-value protected life insurance policy).
128. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1245-46 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
129. Id. at 1248 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,629,135, at 12:46-50).
130. Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,629,135, at 2:26-30).
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'

The Federal Circuit applied the Alice two-prong test and found that the
patented invention was not directed to abstract idea under the first step.' 3
The court reasoned that these claims stand apart from previously invalidated
patents because "they do not merely recite the performance of some business
practice known from the pre-Internet world along with the requirement to
perform it on the intemet."132 "Instead, the claimed solution [was]
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks."' 33 The majority
rejected the dissent's patent-ineligible abstract idea argument in view of the
"store within a store" concept, which suggested a warehouse store that
contains a kiosk for selling a third-party's goods may "lure away"
customers' attention from other kiosks. 3 4 The majority reasoned that such
nature does not apply to the "nature of an Internet 'location' or the nearinstantaneous transport between these locations made possible by standard
Internet communication protocols, which introduces a problem that does not
arise in the 'brick and mortar' context."' 3 5 Though this case opened the door
to software patent validations, only a few software patents were held patenteligible under Section 101 in the following years. 3 6 More importantly, this
case did not clearly define what constitutes "abstract idea" and did not
provide any more instruction than what was given in Alice.13 7
The following three Federal Circuit cases are more instructive but still
adopted no bright-line rule. On May 12, 2016, the Federal Circuit in Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp. held that a "self-referential table," a specific type of
data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves
data in memory, was not directed to abstract idea.138 Here, "the claims
[were] not simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead
[were] specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer
database." 3 9 The court distinguished that this self-referential table "achieves
other benefits over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility,
faster search times, and smaller memory requirements."1 40 Contrary to Alice,

131. Id at 1259.
132. Id. at 1257.
133. Id
134. Id. at 1258 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,629,135, at 2:26-30).
135. Id.
136. See infra APPENDIX A (showing that only 274 patents were invalidated under 35
U.S.C. § 101 between June 19, 2014 and December 22, 2016).
137. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1255-59.
138. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
139. Id at 1337 (emphasis omitted).
140. Id
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the court held that the claims at issue were "directed to an improvement in
the functioning of a computer," and thus, the court was "not persuaded that
the invention's ability to run on a general-purpose computer dooms the
claims."' 4 ' Thereafter, the court concluded that the claims were directed to a
specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts;
therefore, it was not drawn to an abstract idea.1 42
In Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the
claimed invention was directed to a customizable Internet content filtering
scheme.1 43 The court agreed with the lower court that "filtering content is an
abstract idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing
human behavior ... . "144 However, under the second step, the court found
that the claims "do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering
content on the Internet or on generic computer components performing
conventional activities" because the claims "carve out a specific location for
the filtering system" by establishing a remote ISP server and "require the
filtering system to give users the ability to customize filtering for their
individual network accounts."1 45 The court concluded that this filtering
scheme was "significantly more than the abstract idea itself' and that it was
thus patent-eligible subject matter. 146
One of the most recent Federal Circuit cases to uphold the validity of a
software patent was McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.1 47
The patent claims at issue involved the automation of a preexisting 3-D
animation method where the software manipulated the facial expressions of
a 3-D character with the implementation of a specific algorithm.1 48 The

141. Id at 1338. But cf In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (the claims fail to add or transform abstract idea into patent-eligible invention
because it simply receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and
stores the digital images); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims attaching generic computer components to perform "anonymous
loan shopping" are not patent-eligible); Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (computer performed "purely conventional" steps to carry out claims
directed to the "abstract idea of determining a price using organization and product group
hierarchies").
142. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339.
143. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
144. Id. at 1348.
145. Id. at 1352.
146. Id. at 1349, 1352.
147. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
148. Id. at 1307.
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court noted that "the concern underlying the exceptions to § 101 is not
tangibility, but preemption." 4 9 Giving more weight to the preemption
concern, the court held that the claim was not drawn to abstract idea
because, "[b]y incorporating the specific features of the rules as claim
limitations, [the claim] is limited to a specific process for automatically
animating characters using particular information and techniques and does
not preempt approaches that use rules of a different structure or different
techniques." 0
The McRO decision has been interpreted by many scholars in the patent
community as a signal that the so-called pendulum is swinging back to a
more favorable position for patentees.' However, while the McRO decision
has been viewed as a positive development towards software patent validity,
the Federal Circuit continues to affirm more invalidity decisions than it
reverses. 152 In fact, there have been 126 decisions by the Federal Circuit
from October 2016 to April 2017, and the court has affirmed ineligibility in
eighty-four (or 67%) of the decisions. 5 3 The good news is that the
percentage of invalidated software patents has dropped from 61% in 2015 to
54% in 2016, but it is still too early to predict that this will be the trend in
coming years. 154

Substantively, as can be seen from the recent Federal Circuit cases
mentioned above, the court has employed no bright-line rule to test abstract
idea nor has it clearly explained what constitutes "inventive concept" that
adds or improves "significantly more" than mere abstract idea.15 5 For
example, the Digitech court invalidated the method of creating device profile
because it merely used mathematical formulation to transform color and
spatial information of an image into numerical data.1 56 However, the McRO

149. Id at 1315 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 85 (2012)).
150. Id at 1316.
151. Sachs, Alicestorm Fall2016 Update, supra note 97.
152. See infra APPENDIX A.
153. #AliceStorm: April Update and the Impact of TC Heartland on Patent Eligibility,
BILSKI BLOG (June 1, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/06/alicestorm-aprilupdate-and-the-impact-of-tc-heartland.html.
154. See infra APPENDIX B.
155. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1299; Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349-51 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Digitech Image Tech. LLC v. Elec. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2014); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1255-56, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
156. See Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351.
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court validated the method of automating 3-D facial expressions of an
animated character with specific mathematical formulation from a
predetermined data.5 7 Even though both inventions were similar in nature,
the former was drawn to abstract idea and the latter was not. In McRO, the
court put more emphasis on preemption than tangibility and held that
McRO's approach did not preempt others from arriving at the same
invention. 1' While the court could have held that Digitech's method of
creating device profile did not preempt others from arriving at the same
invention, the Federal Circuit refused to validate Digitech's patent claims. 19
Thus, the aforementioned cases leave scholars and practitioners asking
several questions. Where is the line to distinguish something that is
preemptive from something that is not? Where is the line between tangible
and intangible software invention? What constitutes an abstract idea, and
what is the threshold for the patentee to overcome the "inventive concept" to
be patent-eligible? This continuing trend of lack of guidance from the
Federal Circuit has been confusing to many practitioners and USPTO
examiners and has resulted in an unprecedented number of rejections under
Section 101.160 Thus, the central question plaguing software patents what
additional limitation is "enough" to transform a patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patent-eligible application remains unanswered.' 6
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE SOFTWARE BUSINESS

A.

Problems in the Software Industry

The patent system has played a prominent role in shaping the
development of the software industry.1 62 Particularly for small startup
software companies, a startup firm with limited capital often relies on patent
protection to solicit investors to raise capital or as a tether to valuation when
the company is being purchased.1 63 Some scholars point out that "[i]f the
startup has developed software that spurs the development of a new

157. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316.
158. See id. at 1315.
159. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351.
160. See infra APPENDIX A.
161. See Zivojnovic, supra note 32, at 807 08 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.

Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012)).
162. Cohen & Lemley, supranote 8, at 4-5.
163. See GERALD B. HALT, JR. ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS, SOFTWARE AND TECHNOLOGY STARTUPS 92 (2014).
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technology, or serves as a base platform for the development of new
technology, the implications of being the owner of that software could be
immensely profitable if the [intellectual property] rights are properly
protected."1 64

Contrarily, some scholars argue that "[s]oftware simply does not fit the
patent system."1 65 Shane Anderson points out that "the development and
lifecycle of most software is short and technologies are quickly supplanted,
whereas patent prosecution is extremely slow, taking years."1 66 He further
argues that "the twenty-year term of most patents is massively
disproportionate to the lifespan of most software" and concludes that such a
system "works as a barrier to innovation by locking up ideas from those who
could contribute to follow-on innovation."1 67 Given the high rate of failure
or purchase of startup businesses, small companies seeking patent protection
are, more often than not, selling their assets on the secondary market or
during an acquisition or bankruptcy proceedings.1 68 Given the twenty-year
term, this results in a relatively liquid secondary and tertiary market for
patent assets being passed between non-practicing entities or aggregated by
larger technology firms,1 69 which themselves are prone to failure, change,
and merger. 170
James Bessen, in his extensive study of software patents, found that
"relatively few software firms chose to acquire patents" and that "software
patents were much more likely than other patents to be involved in
litigation."17 ' He hypothesizes that some software firms go without patents

164. Id
165. Anderson, supra note 5, at 575.
166. Id
167. Id
168. See Kent Richardson, Erik Oliver & Michael Costa, 2016 Patent Market Size and
Conclusions, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/27/2016patent-market-size-conclusions/id=81717/ (discussing the value of the brokered market and the
$165 million of brokered patent sales in 2016).
169. See id. (discussing the value of the brokered market and the $165 million of
brokered
patent
sales
in
2016);
see,
e.g.,
ICAP
PATENT
BROKERAGE,
http://icappatentbrokerage.com/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2017) (illustrating the common
brokerage of patents).
170. See Michael Novinson, The 10 Biggest Tech Mergers and Acquisitions of 2016,
CRN (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.crn.com/slide-shows/channel-programs/300083199/the-10biggest-tech-mergers-and-acquisitions-of-2016.htm (noting such mergers and acquisitions as
Microsoft and LinkedIn, Salesforce and Demandware, and Oracle and NetSuite).
171. Bessen, supra note 8, at 242-43 (citing JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK

18 (2008)).
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due to a lack of social benefit, a high probability of litigation, and high
costs. 172 He also points out that "[p]ossibly, the inexperience of patent
examiners, the unfamiliarity of software firms with the patent process, and
the difficulty of legal interpretation in court cases for this new subject
matter" may explain the relatively low rate of patent turnout by practicing
software companies.1 73

Some scholars argue that patents provide "a real benefit to startups
because they signal venture capitalists about the quality of the startup's
technology."1 74 If this argument holds true, a patent is expected to provide
"a signal of technology quality or of the quality of firm management" and
should provide an important benefit to startup firms by facilitating
investment.' 75 However, Bessen's study finds that "most software patents
still go to non-software firms."1 76 By "non-software firms" he means patent
trolls or, mostly, companies that not only produce software but also produce
other hardware components. Bessen's study reports the share of patents for
publicly listed software firms and reveals that patents for startup companies
decreasedfrom 16.8% to 13.8% between 1996 and 2006, despite the overall
number of software patents issued. 1 This decline is notable because it
"occurred at a time when it was well understood that software, including
business methods . . . [was] patentable." 7 s "It likely shows that these
innovators understood that patents and software often do not work well
together or that patents are unnecessary for software innovation."1 79
"Moreover, the increase in the share of software patents granted to
software firms is largely accounted for by the activity of a small number of
large software firms."'s Bessen's article provides the lists of the top ten
software patent recipients in 1996 and 2006.8 The lists reveal that large,
well-known software firms such as Microsoft, Oracle, Adobe Systems, and

172. Id at 243.
173. Id
174. Id at 257. To be sure, issued assets provide collateral and can form the basis of a
lien, sale, or valuation. That tangibility the ability to form the basis of loans, collateral, or
other transfer-can be valuable to companies with no other tangible assets other than
employee know-how. But with the startup lifecycle rarely approaching more than one to five
years, a twenty-year term is too high a price to pay in exchange for a legal placeholder.
175. Id
176. Id at 256.
177. Id at 255.
178. Anderson, supra note 5, at 576.
179. Id
180. Bessen, supra note 8, at 256.
181. Id. at 257.
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SAP have increased their patenting by an order of magnitude, and "this
accounts for most of the increase in patents going to the software
industry . .. "182 Furthermore, he notes that these few large firms account
for about 76% and 81% of software patents granted to the software industry
in 1996 and 2006, respectively. 83 Indeed, the most frequent grantee of 2016
was IBM, with more than 8,000 patents issued in 2016 alone, followed by
Samsung, Canon, Qualcomm, Google, Intel, and LG.184 It also stands to
reason that at least one of those entities will either fail, merge, sell, split, or
drastically change direction in the next twenty years, meaning that thousands
of those patents, as liquid assets, could find their way to the open market.'
While it is relatively cheap to prosecute a patent anywhere from
$5,000 to $20,000 is a standard quoted rate for legal fees18 6 many startup
firms grow wary of obtaining a software patent out of fear that they may be
subject to litigation. 187 Clearly, this risk of litigation is easier borne by a
multinational firm than by a small startup, where a one-time $20,000 spend
can break a company. As mentioned earlier, the GAO-13-490 reports that
there has been a significant increase in the number of patent infringement
lawsuits.
The GAO also found that most patent suits involve softwarerelated patents or computer and communications technologies. 8 9 Looking at
this trend, it is difficult for startup firms to ignore possible litigation costs
arising from their self-executed patent. In the GAO-13-465 report, one
stakeholder revealed that "the cost of defending one patent infringement
lawsuit, which excludes any damages awarded, was from $650,000 to $5

182. Id at 256-57.
183. Id
184. Dean Takahashi, IBM Scores a Record 8,000 Patents in 2016, VENTUREBEAT (Jan.
8, 2017, 9:46 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/01/08/ibm-hits-record-breaking-8000patents-granted-in-2016/.
185. The authors note that the current landscape was created by a "largescale increase in
patenting of software" starting roughly twenty years ago. What will the market and litigation
look like ten years from now, with roughly three times as many patents in circulation? See
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, The Software PatentExperiment, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA.
Bus. REV. 1, 9 (2004).
186. See, e.g., How Much Does a Patent Cost, INVENTS
COMPANY,
http://www.invents.com/how-much-does-a-patent-cost/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) (showing
that patent legal fees can range from $5,000 to $15,000).
187. See Bessen, supra note 8, at 243 (discussing how high litigation rates may create
disincentives for investing).
188. See GAO-16-490, supra note 7, at 14.
189. Id at 14, 21.
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million in 2011, depending on how much was at risk."' 9 0 "As for damages
awarded, a 2012 study that looked at all district court patent decisions that
proceeded through trial from 1995 to 2011 found that the median damage
award was over $5 million dollars and that damage awards in [nonpracticing
entity] cases were higher than in other types of suits."'91 Though larger
companies are likely facing higher litigation costs, expensive litigation costs
probably have a more overwhelming impact on startups since they are not as
well-funded and are likely relying on fewer inventions to carry out their
businesses.1 92 That forces small startups to turn to contingency counsel for
assertions, who themselves are self-interested in maximizing licensing
settlements and money judgments to justify a return on their time. 193
The goal of the patent system is to promote science and invention by
granting an exclusive right to inventors. 194 If the patent system fails to
protect these startup companies hampered by many outside factors besides
the quality of their invention itself, then the patent system is flawed and fails
to incentivize the very companies it was created for. For issued patents, the
cat is already out of the bag so to speak little can be done about granted
rights. The best way to fix the system moving forward, however, is to weed
out low-quality patents prior to issue. This would force patent seekers to
engage in targeted, quality prosecution of only those patents meriting
allowance and prevent spurious patents from issuing and wreaking havoc in
the marketplace, which undermines the remaining patents of merit and leads
to calls for further reform in the post-issuance regime. Given the complexity
of modem software, many patent attorneys try to broaden the scope of
claims-as is their job-and examiners have difficulty allowing only the
proper and exact claims, particularly given constraints on their time.
Allowing overly broad claims by the tens of thousands of applications
results in software patent thickets; hence, it drives up the chance of patent
infringement lawsuits, patent aggregation entities licensing portfolios of tens
of thousands of patents, and licensing requests for non-inventive patent
thickets.

190. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP
IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 26 (2013).
19 1. Id.
192. See id. (discussing the significant operational impacts of NPE litigation on small
companies).
193. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 373, 377 (2012) (discussing relationships between small
businesses and contingent lawyers).
194. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Software Patent Thickets

A patent thicket is "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that
those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from
multiple patentees."' 9 5 Shane Anderson argues that "[t]hickets cause undue
hold-up at firms, increase the cost of entry for new players, increase the cost
of Research and Development, and suppress innovation."1 96 Anderson's
article focuses its attention on Research and Development (R&D)
spending.1 97 R&D spending is an important indicator of the worth of a
company's software patent because it shows the willingness of a company to
invest in research and development of its software product. R&D is
commensurate with the Intellectual Property Clause in a sense because R&D
promotes science and technology. However, some scholars assert that
thickets are natural and not particularly concerning. By this they mean that
no correlation exists between software patent spending and R&D
expenditures.1 98 Rather, they argue that "software R&D spending tends to be
relatively stable over time as a percentage of sales" and that "company size
seems to be more important in explaining variations in R&D spending
within the industry."1 99 Anderson, however, points to the uniqueness of the
software industry to explain that an increase in patent thickets reduces R&D
spending. 200 He asserts that "[s]oftware firms are sensitive to delays, and the
first-mover market advantage gained by a firm is extremely
important . . . ." 20 1 Consequently, this advantage "is often a sufficient
incentive by itself to promote R&D."

202

Bessen's study lends support to a causal link that patent thickets cause
less exclusive rights for software inventors, and this assumption leads to
more patent infringement and less R&D spending by software developers. 203
Even though this causal link may seem plausible, many other factors, such
as cross-licensing, company size, timing, and profits may explain R&D

195. Anderson, supra note 5, at 577 (quoting Shapiro, supra note 6, at 119).
196. Id
197. See id. at 576-77.
198. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents FacilitateFinancingin the Software Industry?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 961, 1000 (2005).
199. Id at 1003.
200. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 577.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Bessen, supra note 8, at 248.
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spending behavior. Nonetheless, scholars agree that patent thickets exist and
are troublesome for the software industry.204
What causes patent thickets? For one, software patents, by their very
nature, generally have broad, ambiguous claims and thus do not give clear
notice of either the claimed invention or the patentee's rights. 205 The
USPTO does not require practicable source code or prototypes of invention,
and the enablement requirements have been relaxed for decades; thus,
specifications themselves can be relatively generic, particularly regarding
hardware or the algorithms required to practice the applied-for claims. 206 As
the patent owners can be their own lexicographers, and there are few agreed
upon terms for certain programming actions, it can be difficult to perform
semantic or Boolean searching on existing prior art. Fittingly, the existing
patent thickets make it even harder to find one tree in the forest, so complex
but known concepts under different names often slip through the
examination corps. 207 It is simply unrealistic to think that any examiner can

search through hundreds of thousands of issued software patents, understand
methods and abstract concepts, and apply them efficiently.
Broad and ambiguous claims increase costs imposed by patent thickets
because they increase the chance of a software developer paying the cost of
either licensing or patent infringement litigation that may not even cover the
software created by the developer.208 This self-fulfilling cycle again makes it
more difficult for examiners to identify known or explored concepts when
faced with a record number of applications and grants. Such broad and
ambiguous claims monopolize what is not included in the actual invention
by preempting other inventors from obtaining patents.

204. See Lee Simmons, Why Not Enforcing Patents Can Be a Smart Move, TEX.
ENTERPRISE (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.texasenterprise.utexas.edu/2017/03/02/ibm/why-not-

.

enforcing-patents-can-be-smart-move.
205. Anderson, supra note 5, at 577-78.
206. See, e.g., Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc) (holding U.S. Patent 6,155,840 invalid and finding that the specification did
not disclose sufficient structure corresponding to the means-plus-fimction claims, making
those claims invalid for indefiniteness). Williamson has led to subsequent decisions
invalidating computer-implemented means-plus-fimction claims for failing to disclose an
algorithm in the specification. See, e.g., FO2GO LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. CV 15-100RGA, 2016 WL 747977, at *3-5 (D. Del. 2016), aff'd sub nom. FO2GO LLC v. Pinterest, Inc.,
672 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
207. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (citing
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("It
is a well-established axiom in patent law that a patentee is free to be his or her own
lexicographer.
208. Anderson, supra note 5, at 578.
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For example, Amazon's "one-click" patent spurred much debate among
scholars.20 9 To help capture customers abandoning their shopping carts due
to whatever reason, "Amazon developed an online purchasing method where
shoppers could complete a buying transaction with a single mouse click." 210
On September 28, 1999, the USPTO issued the patent to Amazon that
claimed "[an] online purchasing system where customers enter their credit
card number and billing address information on their initial visit to the
Amazon.com website." 211 The claims further specified that "this personal
information is stored [in] Amazon's database system and when a customer
returns to the website at a later point in time to make purchases, the
customer will not have to reenter their personal information to make an
online purchase." 212 Through such system, returning customers are able to
purchase "with a single click of the mouse."21 3 Around the same time, the
Barnes & Noble website provided an online purchasing system called
"Express Lane," which used a similar method of online purchase as
Amazon's "one-click" patent. 214 The Federal Circuit essentially granted
injunctive relief for Amazon, and "Barnes & Noble was required to resort to
the traditional shopping cart method of online transactions." 215
Consequently, being the only entity holding a patent for completing online
transactions in a single click of the mouse, Amazon has economically
benefited by excluding others from using its patented method. 216
Many scholars point out that "the thicket problem arises from the flood
of patents that are granted by the USPTO . . . ."217 As mentioned in the
example above, the USPTO's imprudent issuance of the "one-click" patent
contributes to the "thicket problem" and bestows more than enough
monopoly power to a single entity. 218 A study conducted prior to the Alice
decision found that the number of software patents granted per year was

209. HALT ET AL., supra note 163, at 96-97.
210. Id at 96.
211. Id.
212. Id
213. Id
214. See id.
215. Id at 96-97.
216. Id at 97.
217. Anderson, supra note 5, at 578 (citing Shrestha, supra note 19, at 125); see Michael
J. Murer, Business Method Patents and PatentFloods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 309, 309-10
(2002) (describing the problems created by patent floods).
218. See HALT ET AL., supra note 163, at 96-97 (discussing the monopoly that "oneclick" has given Amazon).
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increasing.219 Professor Mark Lemley also points out that the USPTO has
been issuing "a large number of dubious patents over the past 20 years,
particularly in the software and electronic commerce space." 220 He further
notes that the USPTO has been "issu[ing] many more patents than its
counterparts in Europe and Japan," granting roughly one or more patents to
three-fourths of applicants. 22 1

Compounding the problem, low-quality patents are difficult to overturn
or invalidate because courts require defendants to provide "clear and
convincing evidence" to invalidate issued patents, presuming that the
USPTO has already done a good job of screening out bad patents. 222
Intuitively, having more patents results in a higher probability of overlaps in
claims. Thus, a natural solution is for "the USPTO to grant fewer software
patents and diminish the growing thicket." 223 However, Lemley disagrees
that the problem lies in the USPTO issuing many bad patents. 224 Rather,
Lemley argues that the problem arises from the USPTO issuing "a small but
worrisome number of economically significant bad patents and those patents
enjoy a strong but undeserved presumption of validity." 225
Low-quality patents have significant social costs and must be eliminated
to maintain a healthy patent system. This was at the core of the Alice
decision. Looking at the hard-to-grasp and growing number of issued patents
and the growing number of frivolous patent infringement suits in software
and business method patents, the problem has grown worse, if not better, in
Alice's wake. However, the Supreme Court did not iterate a clear test for the
lower courts, 226 nor has the Federal Circuit been able to reach a clear and
consistent ruling on Section 101 after Alice. 227 While the USPTO has

219. See Bessen, supra note 8, at 252.
220. Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office, 13 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 83, 83
(2013).
221. Id
222. Id at 84.
223. Anderson, supra note 5, at 578.
224. Lemley, supranote 220, at 84.
225. Id (citing Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents, REGULATION, Winter
2005-2006, at 10, 12).
226. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355-57 (2014)
(neglecting to define an abstract idea).
227. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp. Inc. v. Linear LLC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 614 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (holding an Alarm System Patent had other additional commands and inputs that made it
patent-eligible).
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programs in place meant to address low-quality patents,228 patents continue
to issue in record numbers, 229 suggesting that at least some patent owners are
still receiving allowances. Furthermore, the USPTO's significant increase in
the rejection rate for software patents under Section 101 evidences applicant
3
confusion, though it has not slowed the overall rate of patent grants .2

0

So,

where do we find the solution to fix this software patent thicket problem? As
Lemley and other scholars point out, the core of this solution lies in the
USPTO's examination process.
IV. A ROADMAP
A.

FOR THE

USPTO

Patent Claim Value and Solutions to Low-Quality Patent Claims

A fundamental principle of traditional patent law theory is that a
patentee's right to exclude others benefits the patentee and is needed to
make the patent system work. 231' The quid pro quo of the information
disclosures required by patent law and the exclusive rights given to patentees
are critical to creating significant informational value to the patent owner
and to the public. 23 2 Ideally, patents with fulsome disclosures that teach clear
boundaries of inventions to the public are vital to warn potential infringers
of their limits. Patent claims are "the touchstone of patent protection" and set
forth the patentee's proprietary boundaries. 23 3 Thus, the patent examiner's
job, shaping those boundaries by limiting insignificant claims during the
examination process, is crucial to solving software patent thicket problems
and to potentially reducing infringement suits brought by non-practicing

entities (NPE).
Anderson argues that "[w]ithout the requisite institutional and legal
tools, it is virtually inevitable that large swaths of low quality software
patents will find their way out the USPTO's door." 234 More specifically,
Lemley lays out possible reconstruction of the USPTO's examination

228. See Patent Quality, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/patent-quality (last
visited Oct. 27, 2017) (explaining the three areas the USPTO has focused on to ensure patent
quality).
229. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/us stat.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) (showing a table of the number of issued
patents from 1963-2015).
230. See infra APPENDIX C (showing the rejection rate after the Alice decision).
231. Asay, supra note 4, at 259 (discussing the value of patents).
232. Id. at 275.
233. CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 62-63 (4th ed. 2016).
234. Anderson, supra note 5, at 577.
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process to fix the "bad patents" problem. 235 And, in 2016, scholars Melissa
F. Wasserman and Michael D. Frakes demonstrated that the first year of
examination-and subsequent examining behavior-can lead to substantive
outcomes.236

Adopting some of their views, we propose the following three solutions.
First, as Lemley suggests, one solution to bad patent allowances is to adopt a
mandatory second-pair-of-eyes process similar to past efforts. 237 This means
subjecting patent applications to mandatory assessment by more than one
examiner before approval. 238 This will capture more mistakes, ensure quality
control, and will work to prevent tunnel vision or rogue examiners. Second,
the USPTO needs more examiners with proper training and increased
incentives for examining-and in many cases, not allowing-software
patent applications. They should not only be equipped with engineering or
science knowledge, but also with legal knowledge to correctly apply legal
standards to patent applications. For example, instead of bluntly rejecting
software patent applications under Section 101, examiners need to conduct a
careful examination to differentiate accurate claims from those ambiguous
and broad ones following the Federal Circuit decisions-and pay equal
attention to disclosure and Section 112 problems. Third, the request for
continued examination (RCE) must be tailored to prevent meritless patent
claims. Patent applicants are currently allowed to file an unlimited number
of RCEs, which are requests by an applicant to reopen examination of the
patent application after the prosecution of the application has closed.239 As a
result of applicants possibly filing several RCEs, worn-out examiners may
end up allowing meritless claims to determined applicants due to repetitive
and never-ending work. The proposal for limiting the number of RCEs under
the former Dudas Administration had merit and should be revisited. 240 It

235. See generally Lemley, supra note 220 (examining solutions to fix the USPTO).
236. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 Duke L.J.
1601, 1603 (2016) (stating "the year an examiner was hired may help explain her granting
proclivities").
237. See Dennis Crouch, PTO: Second Pair of Eyes and Quality Review, PATENTLY-O
(Apr. 2, 2007), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/04/ptosecondpair.html
(discussing
expanding the now-defunct program, once limited to business-method patents).
238. Lemley, supra note 220, at 91.
239. Robert R. Sachs, Busting the Myth of the Unlimted RCEs, BILSKI BLOG (Dec. 1,
2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/12/busting-the-myth-of-the-unlimited-rces.html
(citing GAO-16-490, supra note 7, at 31) [hereinafter Sachs, Busting Myth].
240. See Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 809 (E.D. Va. 2008), enforced sub nom.
Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that rules at 72 Fed. Reg.
46,716 exceeded scope of PTO's rulemaking authority); Changes to Practice for Continued
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would likewise behoove the administration to limit or scale the use of RCEs
through their fee-setting authority or other "soft" means to influence or
"nudge" behavior. 241' The following sections will discuss these proposals in
further detail.
B.

Second-Pair-of-Eyes

In 1998, when the Federal Circuit held business methods patentable, the
USPTO was inundated with business method patent applications. 24 2 In
response, the USPTO initiated a specific "quality control" measure, the
"second-pair-of-eyes" review (SPER), under which applications were
subjected to "mandatory assessment by more than one examiner before
being allowed." 243 A study found that SPER had a dramatic effect: the
lowest grant rate among high-volume classes.

244

This grant rate reflected

"better rigor during examinations rather than application volume." 245 But
SPER has its drawbacks; in theory, it would increase the cost of prosecution
and would delay the process. These drawbacks would be exacerbated in the
software context, where the grant rate is already at its lowest (though the
application rate is still extremely high, with many companies engaging in the
"spray-and-pray" approach), and such a burden on the cost of prosecution
would then turn into higher application fees. This would essentially burden
startups with higher prosecution costs upfront.
Nonetheless, SPER is a worthwhile practice to be revisited at the
USPTO because it would significantly reduce the patent thicket in software.
The Supreme Court's Alice decision and the following Federal Circuit
decisions mainly stemmed from software patent thickets. 246 The meritless
claims granted by the USPTO spurred an increasing number of infringement
suits with which non-practicing entities, or patent trolls, emerged to make

Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and
Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007).
241. See generally RICHARD H.

THALER & CASS R.

SUNSTEIN, NUDGE

(2008)

(explaining how behavioral analysis and nonrestrictive procedural regulations greatly
influence behavior, and suggesting that the government use "liberal paternalism" to influence
outcomes without dictating individual actions or restrictions).
242. See Lemley, supranote 220, at 91.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 91-92.
246. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)
(demonstrating a broad and meritless claim growing the patent thicket).
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benefits off of these broad and ambiguous claims.24 7 Although SPER may
shift the burden on the USPTO in terms of cost and time consumption, it is
likely to weed out unpatentable claims and, at the same time, catch some
good ones within the net of rejected applications. Consider this: if appealed
all the way to the Federal Circuit, a denial of an application can be seen by
up to seventeen pairs of eyes before finally being rejected after an appeal. In
most instances, current allowances are seen by one. In terms of basic
balance, it seems reasonable to ask for a more searching review of claims
before they are allowed. Anecdotally, Mr. Stroud experienced some informal
SPER practices as an examiner, with good results. A second opinion is
almost never a bad thing, and the costs at that stage are marginal, as opposed
to the expensive, time-consuming, and ultimately inefficient second look
performed by the courts or the PTAB.
One concern is that SPER is useless if examiners are not properly
trained to review claims in patent applications, or at worst would increase
cost and delay without affecting quality. These concerns can be mitigated
with proper training at the USPTO. Modern technology advances at
breakneck speed. To keep up with this rapid change, examiners must be
knowledgeable about the trends and detailed workings of new inventions
and must have the support of others. The current requirement to be an
examiner at the USPTO is a bachelor's degree in engineering or another
specified science background. 248 Comparatively, many private companies
employ people with a Ph.D. or master's degree to research and develop their
products and work with patent attorneys to apply for patents. Even though a
higher educational background is not the sole indicator that a person is
sufficiently knowledgeable in the technical area, the USPTO must provide
relevant and proper training for examiners and seek to hire and incentivize
high-quality, technically trained examiners to close the gap, so that
examiners can understand the specifications and claims recited in the
applications.

247. See Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 25, 34-35
(Nat'l
Bureau
of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
20322,
2014),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20322.pdf
248. USPTO, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN
PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/OEDGRB.pdf.
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Setting Fees and a Callfor Consistent Guidance

When the Class 705, a technology area that reviews business method
applications, adopted SPER in 2001 to initiate quality control, it created an
enormous backlog of patent applications as examiners would reject
applications, and applicants would attempt to continue examination through
other mechanisms.249 As discussed in the first proposal, SPER may lead to a
backlog, so there must be another mechanism to prevent the examination
process from slowing down while still enforcing effective quality control
measures.
A simple and intuitive solution to relieve the enormous backlog is to
hire more examiners and to reasonably limit RCE practice, as outlined
below. Training may take new hires some time to get up to speed on the
application examination, but it would surely add more workforce to speed up
the examination process. Some argue that the USPTO itself is overworked
and underfunded. 250 According to GAO's interview with patent examiners,
examiners said that time pressures on examiners are a central challenge for
patent quality. 25' Based on GAO's survey of patent examiners, GAO
estimated that 70% of the examiners say they do not have enough time to
complete a thorough examination given a typical workload. 252 If more
examiners are available to do the work, then each examiner can take on a
fewer number of applications for a more thorough examination. This could
prevent the examination process from slowing down and could serve as one
possible solution to the backlog problem while maintaining patent quality.
But, as some note, an increase in the number of employees simply
means more expenses for the USPTO, and such increases in expenses can
mean shifting its burden on the applicants and patentees to collect more
fees. 253 Lemley argues against spending more money to pay for a more
intensive examination, finding that "[m]ost of that money will be wasted on
applications that are of no consequence to anyone." 254 We disagree. That is
the prerogative of companies seeking meritless or questionable claims;
rigorous examination should not retard allowance of truly innovative patent
claims. If the fees can be collected and spent constructively, then they will
serve as a good weapon to improve patent quality. Furthermore, they will

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See Lemley, supranote 220, at 88.
Anderson, supra note 5, at 576.
GAO- 16-490, supra note 7, at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
See Lemley, supranote 220, at 88-89.
Id. at 86.
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limit RCEs and issued patents. Making fee-setting authority permanent
would clearly contribute to the USPTO's ability to properly address the
issue.
Under the America Invents Act, the USPTO is authorized to set fees.255
For example, the USPTO can "charge substantial maintenance fees for
existing patents even though maintaining a patent once granted costs the
[USPTO] nothing." 25 6 One counter is that the USPTO raising maintenance
fees may cause patentees to abandon their patents altogether, regardless of
whether it is a good patent or bad patent. 257 But for patents with merit, a
higher cost should be offset by licensing and product development of
operating companies. Given the lifecycle of innovation versus patents, few
startups will be confronted with paying maintenance fees, and conversely,
patent aggregators or NPEs simply holding or asserting assets would be
forced to make harder decisions over which patents to keep (i.e., those with
merit) and which to abandon (i.e., meritless patents).
In theory, higher application fees could deter startups from applying for
patents. We agree. But the USPTO could and should further raise requests
for reexamination fees to disincentivize endless examination. Furthermore,
the USPTO should raise reissue and reexamination fees because a patentee
who wants to redefine the boundary of his already issued patents will likely
do so for strategic business reasons and will likely pay a higher price for it.
The USPTO could also raise fees in the other areas to recoup its costs
accordingly to allow for a more thorough examination, reexamination, or
review, while not deterring inventors and patentees from filing or
maintaining their patents. Even if the USPTO raises fees in other areas and
burdens small entities, if the resulting patent system guarantees clear
boundaries of the claims, and thus brings down the chance of getting sued or
involved in litigation, then investors will likely mark that money down for
what it is worth. The only party to truly lose in that situation would be the
well-paid patent bar. The question is whether the USPTO can spend the
money constructively to improve patent quality.
Some voice concerns that "the USPTO simply does not staff examiners
with the knowledge required to parse software patents."258 While the authors

255. Id. at 85.
256. Id
257. Id at 86.
258. Anderson, supra note 5, at 577; cf Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents:
Chaos at the USPTO or Business as Usual?, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 347, 355 (2001)
(stating that the USPTO had increased difficulty with business method patents as there were
few examiners with the appropriate background).
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have found that the USPTO employs thousands of highly skilled and trained
examiners and has done its best with an unwieldy number of applications
and examiners, investing in proper training for examiners can help address
the above issue. Another way to approach this issue is to find better ways to
measure patent quality. It is currently difficult to judge what is a good or bad
patent given market concern, legal flux, and other considerations.
Nonetheless, the USPTO does not currently have a consistent definition for
patent quality articulated in agency documents and guidance, which would
be in line with best practices for organizational performance. 25 9 Thus, the
USPTO is unable to fully measure progress toward meeting its patent quality
goals. If examiners are equipped with such guidelines containing clear
definitions and can apply those definitions on application claims, there will
be a more coherent and consistent examination process.
D. Request for ContinuedExaminationPractice
One of the biggest contributors to pendency times and eventual grants of
questionable claims is the so-called request for continued examination
(RCE) practice. 260 An RCE is "a request by an applicant to reopen
examination of the patent application after the prosecution of the application
has been closed." 26 1To obtain an RCE, an applicant is only required to file a
new submission and pay the additional fees.

262

Surprisingly, there is no limit

on the number of times an applicant may file an RCE. 263 Because USPTO
rules and procedures do not restrict the number of RCEs an applicant may
file, issuing the patent is the only means by which the USPTO can end the
examination process.

264

This creates an environment where issued patents do

not fully meet patentability standards because such unlimited attempts to
secure a patent can wear down examiners, making them more likely to
eventually grant the patent. 265 Thus, the commonplace adage: "keep a
continuation alive."

259. See GAO-13-465, supra note 190, at 41-43 (discussing issues with patent quality
without any clear definition for patent quality).
260. Sean Tu, Understanding the Backlog Problems Associated with Requests for
Continued Examination Practice, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 216, 218-19 (2014-2015); see
also GAO-16-490, supra note 7, at 32 (stating that unlimited RCE requests may wear down
examiners and eventually make them more likely to grant a patent).
261. Sachs, Busting Myth, supra note 239 (citing GAO- 16-490, supra note 7, at 31).
262. GAO-16-490, supra note 7, at 8.
263. Id at 8.
264. Id at 27-28.
265. GAO-16-490, supra note 7, at 32.
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Some contend that "the problem of 'unlimited' RCEs is a myth." 266
While admitting that the patent statute does not limit the number of RCEs,
Robert Sachs argues that "the reality of patent examination and prosecution
yields a negligible number of high count RCE patents," and that "they have
no impact on the patent litigation landscape." 267 His study found that the
amount of litigation resulting from RCE patents was not significantly more
than the amount of litigation resulting from his control group of random
patent samples. 268 From his findings, he posits that because "more RCEs
typically means more office actions, which in turn implies more
amendments . . . as the applicant attempts to narrow the claims," high-count

RCE patents themselves do not contribute to patent litigation. 269
Sachs's argument is unconvincing as he bases his study on RCE patents
that should not have been granted in the first place. The entire sum of patent
litigation that results from RCE patents could be avoided if they were not
issued in the first place. Clearly, it cannot and should not be said that all
RCE patents are low-quality. However, many of them may contain claims
that add no value to our patent system or claims that respond directly to
later-developed market competitors rather than the original invention. If the
USPTO implements rules and procedures to limit the number of RCEs, or to
steeply increase the cost of each subsequent request, the amount of patent
litigation can decrease accordingly, reducing the number of RCE patents that
issue. Therefore, limiting the number of RCE attempts will clear dockets and
reinvest examiners' energy to other patent applications, and thus use internal
resources more efficiently.
V.

CONCLUSION

Software patent applications are among the most complex, abstract
patents that the USPTO has to examine. The above proposals do not directly
confront the ambiguous two-prong test in the Alice decision nor should
that be the USPTO's job but they may serve as tools for improving patent
claim quality. Higher quality valid issued patent claims will help the courts
to pay deference to the USPTO's decisions; avoid post-grant review; and
later bodies and courts will be more likely to uphold the validity and
eligibility of patent claims. Furthermore, fewer low-quality patent claims
would decrease patent litigation lawsuits because litigants would be deterred

266.
267.
268.
269.

See Sachs, Busting Myth, supra note 239.
Id.
See infra APPENDIX D (displaying a graph of issued patents).
Sachs, Busting Myth, supra note 239.
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from fighting over validity and patentability. These suggestions will not end
the patent troll problem. These entities will continue to collect patents to sue
and license others for patent infringement. But the problem does not lie in
the fact that patent trolls sue or threaten to sue others to collect licensing
fees; rather, it is the ready availability of both issued and purchased broad
and ambiguous software patent claims that can be asserted for broader
exclusivity than the actual invention covers. If the USPTO would issue
higher quality software patent claims that the PTAB and courts could uphold
as largely valid, patentable, and eligible, more companies would likely turn
to licensing those higher quality patent claims rather than taking their
chances in courts-conversely, making the jobs of assertors with highquality patents much easier by settling rights and expectations before
incurring further transaction costs.
There are many approaches to protecting software. Nonetheless, the
consensus among many scholars and practitioners is that courts need to
clarify and give meaningful guidance for the USPTO in issuing Section 101
rulings. The above proposals will not solve our patent problems, but they
may improve the quality of future-issued software patents and, in essence,
stabilize our patent system by setting a higher standard for issuing patent
claims. Establishing a more stable system would help startup companies
attain more meaningful patent portfolios to conduct their businesses and
seek out investors. To begin to deal with this cavalcade of problems, the first
step is to weed out low-quality patent claims.
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APPENDIX

A.

PERCENTAGE OF PATENT INELIGIBILITY UNDER

35 U.S.C.

§ 101270

I

405

274

67.7%

73

65

89.0%

332

209

63.0%

270. Note: Percentage of ineligible patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 between June 19, 2014
and December 22, 2016. Source: http://www.bilskiblog.com.
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SOFTWARE PATENTS CHALLENGED UNDER 35

[VOL.

69:177

U.S.C. § 101271
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180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2015

2014

2016

m Invalid a Valid

271. Note: Number of software patents ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 between 2014
and 2016. Source: http://www.bilskiblog.com.
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SECTION 101 REJECTION RATE POST-ALiCE BY ART UNIT 272

Tech Type
Biotech

Art Unit Tech
Chemical Engineering
Immunology
Microbiology
MolecularBiology
Computers Communications & Networking
Computer Engineering
Computer Science & Applications
Cryptography
Ecommerce Business Crypto
Business Processing
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E-Shopping
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Other
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Chemical Engineering
Civil Engineering
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5116 Examiner
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272. Note: Rejection rate at the USPTO by technology type and art unit before and after
the Alice decision. Source: http://www.bilskiblog.com.
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PERCENTAGES OF ISSUED PATENTS BY NUMBER OF RCES
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Figure 1: Percentages of Issued Patents by Number of RCEs
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